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WHEN SHOULD BANKRUPTCY BE AN OPTION (FOR
PEOPLE, PLACES, OR THINGS)?
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.*
ABSTRACT
When many people think about bankruptcy, they have a simple
left-to-right spectrum of possibilities in mind. The spectrum starts
with personal bankruptcy, moves next to corporations and other
businesses, and then to municipalities, states, and finally countries.
We assume that bankruptcy makes the most sense for individuals;
that it makes a great deal of sense for corporations; that it is
plausible but a little more suspect for cities; that it would be quite
odd for states; and that bankruptcy is unimaginable for a country.
In this Article, I argue that the left-to-right spectrum is sensible
but mistaken. After defining “bankruptcy,” I outline a series of
puzzles for the standard intuitions, such as the absence of personal
bankruptcy in many countries and the fact that state bankruptcy is
in some respects more defensible than municipal bankruptcy. I then
develop and apply a five-factor framework that considers: (1) whether
unsustainable debt is a potential problem; (2) the benefits of
reshaping decision-making incentives; (3) the risk of premature
liquidation; (4) the dignity of the debtor; and (5) spillover effects.
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. My thanks
to Ryan Bubb, Kevin Davis, Barry Friedman, Clay Gillette, David Kamin, Mitchell Kane,
Michael Levine, Troy McKenzie, Adam Samaha, Catherine Sharkey, and participants at a
faculty workshop at New York University School of Law and at the 2012 Wythe Lecture for
helpful comments. I thank the faculty of William & Mary Law School for inviting me to give
the 2012 Wythe Lecture and the editors of the Law Review for inviting me to publish the
lecture as revised here.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, bankruptcy has been
proposed as a potential solution for the financial distress of an ever
expanding group of entities. Three years ago, at a time when
California was projecting annual deficits of more than $10 billion
each year and Illinois’s pensions were radically underfunded, a
handful of U.S. politicians flirted with the idea of proposing a
bankruptcy framework for U.S. states.1 A decade earlier, after
Argentina’s most recent default, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) proposed, and briefly defended, a statutory framework it
dubbed the “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.”2 In each
case, the proposals were quickly shot down, although neither seems
to be entirely dead. As Greece’s finances deteriorated in 2009 and
2010, for instance, the architect of the earlier IMF proposal rolled
out a new version adapted to the European Union.3
At least for those of us in the United States, the fate of these
proposals fits perfectly with widespread intuitions about where
bankruptcy does and does not make sense. Whether they are
bankruptcy experts or lay people, when most people think about
bankruptcy, they have a simple left-to-right spectrum of possibilities
in mind. The spectrum starts with personal bankruptcy, moves next
to corporations and other businesses, and then to municipalities,
states, and finally countries. We assume that bankruptcy makes the
most sense for individuals; that it makes a great deal of sense for
corporations; that it is plausible but a little more suspect for cities;
1. See, e.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011,
at A19 (“This approach begins with a new chapter in the federal Bankruptcy Code that
provides for voluntary bankruptcy by states.”).
2. Anne Krueger, then First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary
Fund, announced the initiative in a speech in 2002. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing
Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech Before Institute for International Economics at the
Conference on “Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards”: New Approaches to Sovereign
Debt Restructuring (Apr. 1, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/
040102.htm.
3. FRANÇOIS GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
RESOLUTION: A PROPOSAL vi-vii, 26 (Andrew Fielding ed., 2010), available at http://www.
bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mechanism-for-
sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal/#.URUlCo5kJ94.
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that it would be quite odd for states; and that bankruptcy is
unimaginable for a country.
The left-to-right spectrum also roughly parallels the history of
federal bankruptcy law in the United States. The first federal
bankruptcy law, enacted in 1800 and repealed several years later,
was designed for merchants and traders—that is, individuals in
business.4 Subsequent nineteenth-century bankruptcy laws focused
primarily on individuals and small businesses. Congress first added
large-scale corporate reorganization to the bankruptcy laws in 1933
and 1934,5 and it enacted the first municipal bankruptcy law in
1934.6
If we are working with this left-to-right spectrum in the back of
our mind, the quick demise of proposals for a state or country
bankruptcy framework is just what we would expect. The reaction
to Detroit’s recent bankruptcy filing has also been consistent with
the usual intuitions.7 Municipal bankruptcy is right in the middle
of the spectrum, the point at which many observers may get a little
queasy about the desirability of bankruptcy. In the past, nearly
every municipal bankruptcy filing involved special-purpose entities
like a sewage or water district or a small town, not a sizeable city.8
Bankruptcy seemed harmless enough for these entities. But Detroit
is different. It is a major city, and many wonder whether bank-
ruptcy is an acceptable destination for a city.9
4. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14-15 (1995) (describing 1800 Act).
5. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 103-107 (2001) (describing enactment of corporate reorganization provisions for
railroads in 1933 and nonrailroad corporations in 1934).
6. The 1934 law was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional in Ashton
v. Cameron Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), but its 1937 successor was
upheld two years later in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
7. Detroit entered bankruptcy on July 18, 2013, filing its petition shortly before a state
court judge issued a series of rulings purporting to enjoin Michigan officials from permitting
or participating in the bankruptcy. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions
in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, at A1; Detroit Files for
Bankruptcy, Setting off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July
19, 2013, 7:47 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS01/307180107.
8. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 359 & n.43, 360-61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 as “used
by tiny municipalities under peculiar circumstances”).
9. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Detroit’s Bankruptcy Is Just Politics by Other Means, FORBES
(July 19, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/07/19/detroits-
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I hope to show in this Article that the standard shorthand for
determining when bankruptcy should be an option is simply wrong.
Although the intuitions are widespread and perfectly understand-
able, the left-to-right spectrum turns out to be incoherent. To
develop this argument, I will begin by identifying a series of puzzles
for the conventional wisdom. Using the left-to-right spectrum as our
guide, we would expect, for instance, personal bankruptcy statutes
to be ubiquitous, but they are not. Although state bankruptcy’s near
neighbor on the spectrum is corporate bankruptcy, it has far more
in common with personal bankruptcy. State bankruptcy may make
more sense, not less, than bankruptcy for municipalities. And
bankruptcy is hard to justify for some corporations. At some point,
as the anomalies multiply, it is time for another paradigm, or so I
will argue.
If we throw out the standard spectrum, what are we left with? My
second objective in this Article is to try to develop a more useful
framework for considering whether and when bankruptcy makes
sense. Drawing liberally from the existing literature, I will offer a
five-factor typology for determining whether a bankruptcy frame-
work is appropriate in any given context. The typology does not
remove all questions about whether bankruptcy should be an option
for any type of individual or entity, but it focuses attention on the
key factors and relevant tradeoffs. The typology also helps to
explain an odd disconnect in contemporary bankruptcy theory: the
sharp differences between the normative justifications for corporate
bankruptcy, on the one hand, and for consumer bankruptcy, on the
other.10
Some may question whether a framework like this is necessary or
useful. Why not simply ask, for instance, whether a bankruptcy
option would be efficient and would minimize the cost of credit? To
this objection, I give two answers. First, the five factors operational-
ize the efficiency concern by focusing attention on the particular
factors that will determine whether bankruptcy is likely to be
bankruptcy-is-just-politics-by-other-means.
10. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225 (1986)
(characterizing the key issue in business bankruptcy as addressing a common pool problem,
but describing the fresh start for consumer debtors as having “nothing to do with the rights
of claimants inter se or with the notion that bankruptcy exists to solve a common pool
problem”).
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efficient in any given context. They give content to the efficiency
analysis. Second, sometimes we do not want to minimize the cost of
credit, as for example in contexts where potential spillover effects
come into play. The five-factor framework allows us to account both
for non-efficiency concerns and for the full range of efficiency issues.
Before I introduce the puzzles that seem to confound the left-to-
right spectrum on bankruptcy, I should first explain what I mean by
bankruptcy. I offer a very simple definition in Part I. I turn to the
puzzles in Part II, outline the typology in Part III, and offer a series
of applications in Part IV. I should note that I will focus entirely on
the question of whether some kind of bankruptcy option is desirable,
not the particular details of any given bankruptcy framework. I will
not be concerned, except incidentally, with key issues such as the
optimal priority rules or who should be permitted to initiate
bankruptcy.11
I. WHAT IS BANKRUPTCY?
For my purposes, bankruptcy has four basic attributes.12 First,
bankruptcy enables a debtor to restructure its obligations. Thus, if
the debtor owes $100 to a creditor, bankruptcy provides a way to
reduce this obligation, so that it is decreased, say, to $70 or perhaps
wiped out altogether. The extent to which the obligation is restruc-
tured will generally depend on the debtor’s assets, current income,
11. The distinction between the existence of a bankruptcy framework and its details is,
of course, permeable. The ability to create enforceable priorities may be one of the strongest
arguments in favor of enacting a bankruptcy law in some contexts. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton
& David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework
be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 799 (2004) (describing the absolute priority rule in
bankruptcy as counteracting the incentive for sovereigns to overborrow as they near financial
distress).
12. My definition loosely tracks the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Congress’s
constitutional power to enact bankruptcy laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Bankruptcy
has come to include nearly any reasonably comprehensive framework for adjusting a debtor’s
obligations, providing for payment of creditors, and giving the debtor a discharge. For a short
and still useful discussion, see Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in
BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 131, 137-38 (1988) (characterizing the case law as “com[ing] close to
permitting Congress complete freedom in formulating and enacting bankruptcy legislation”).
The most complete treatment of Congress’s bankruptcy authority is Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt
and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605,
612-13 (2008) (developing a constitutional theory of bankruptcy). 
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or both. But the important thing is that the obligation is reduced as
a matter of law—the debtor now owes $70 or $0, not $100. The
technical term is that part or all of the original obligation is
“discharged.”13
Second, bankruptcy is imposed or facilitated by government or
another third party. If a debtor owes $100 to a creditor and cannot
pay it all, the debtor and creditor can, of course, agree on their own
that the debtor will only pay $70, rather than $100. This is a private
restructuring or workout, but it is not bankruptcy.14 Bankruptcy is
not purely private; there is a public role.15
Third, it is collective in nature. A bankruptcy framework adjusts
the debtor’s relationship with most or all of its creditors, not just
one.16 A law that enables a debtor to discharge a particular
obligation—say, a law that provided a partial or full tax amnesty to
debtors who disclosed previously hidden income—would restructure
an important debt, but it would not by itself be a bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy provides a collective forum for resolving financial
distress.
Finally, bankruptcy is specific to a particular individual, enter-
prise, or entity.17 We could in theory restructure every business in
an industry at the same time,18 but that is not the way bankruptcy
ordinarily works. Bankruptcy is specific to a particular debtor.
Those who are familiar with insolvency law may immediately
think of examples that do not fit neatly within the description I
have just provided. For instance, most states have assignment for
13. In U.S. bankruptcy law, each of the major “chapters” has a discharge provision. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 944(b), 1141(d), 1328(a) (2012) (providing discharge provisions for
chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13). 
14. See Claire Finkelstein, Financial Distress as a Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for
Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE L.J. 2205, 2205 (1993) (describing
private workouts as non-judicial).
15. In the United States, the formal authority for bankruptcy comes from the Bankruptcy
Clause in Article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
16. For example, the Bankruptcy Code prevents creditors from continuing to collect on
their debts from a debtor who has filed a petition for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (indicating who may be eligible debtors).
18. Joseph Stiglitz’s “super chapter 11” proposal is the best known example of multi-firm
bankruptcy. Marcus Miller & Joseph Stiglitz, Bankruptcy Protection Against Macroeconomic
Shocks: The Case for a ‘Super Chapter 11’ 4 (Apr. 16, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Univ. of Warwick Ctr. for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalism), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/fincrises/milrstig.pdf/.
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the benefit of creditors statutes that function very much like our
federal bankruptcy laws.19 Under an assignment law, a trustee
takes control of the firm’s assets, ordinarily sells them, and
distributes the proceeds to creditors.20 In recent years, many
troubled businesses or their creditors have used state assignment
laws as an alternative to bankruptcy, often due to the increased
costs of a traditional bankruptcy after Congress’s 2005 amendments
to the bankruptcy laws.21 State assignment laws have essentially
the same effect as bankruptcy. They differ only in that they usually
do not formally discharge all of the debtor’s obligations. But the
absence of a discharge has little significance if the business that is
subject to an assignment for the benefit of creditors is a corporation,
because limited liability already removes shareholders’ personal
responsibility for the obligations of the business.22 Indeed, based on
this reasoning, corporations that are liquidated under the bank-
ruptcy laws are not given a discharge.23 Assignment laws can thus
be seen as bankruptcy laws, at least for debtors that have limited
liability.
Bank resolution laws, such as the new resolution powers given to
bank regulators under the Dodd-Frank Act, are other borderline
cases. Many commentators, including this one, distinguish between
Dodd-Frank resolution and bankruptcy, usually characterizing
Dodd-Frank or other bank insolvency rules as “administrative
resolution,” in contrast with bankruptcy under the bankruptcy
laws.24 The key difference lies in the fact that regulators control the
entire process in an administrative resolution, with little input from
19. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose
Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1001-03 (1995).
20. Id. at 1005-06.
21. See, e.g., John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 405, 405-06.
22. The same reasoning also applies to other entities that enjoy limited liability, such as
limited liability companies or limited liability partnerships.
23. The exception applies to any “debtor [that] is not an individual.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)
(2012).
24. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large
Financial Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 436-37 (2012) (comparing administrative
resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act with bankruptcy). The bankruptcy laws do not apply to
banks or insurance companies, each of which is handled under their own administrator-run
insolvency regimes. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (excluding banks and insurance companies from
chapter 7).
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the parties themselves. Administrative resolution has the virtues of
speed, flexibility, and regulatory expertise, while sacrificing
transparency and other rule-of-law virtues, such as clear priority
rules.25 Although the distinctions between administrative resolution
and traditional bankruptcy are enormously important, administra-
tive resolution has each of the characteristics that define a bank-
ruptcy regime: it is facilitated by the government, collective, specific
to an individual debtor, and discharges the debtor’s obligations.26
With the new Dodd-Frank framework and other administrative
resolution rules, we are clearly in the realm of bankruptcy.
If administrative resolution and bankruptcy are both bankruptcy
for our purposes, some may wonder what responses to financial
distress would not qualify as bankruptcy. Non-comprehensive state
law collection remedies—such as a creditor’s right to foreclose on the
property collateralizing its loan—are not bankruptcy. Nor is a
central government’s decision to provide rescue financing to a
troubled bank or business, or a state law putting a financial control
board in place to oversee a troubled city’s finances. If a debtor
simply defaults on one or more of its obligations, this too is an
alternative to bankruptcy.
II. A FEW BANKRUPTCY PUZZLES
As I have already mentioned, if we think about bankruptcy as a
potential response to the financial distress of individuals, corpora-
tions, cities, states, and countries, most of us would assume that the
case for bankruptcy is very strong at the start of this list, and it
gradually weakens as we go from left to right. Surely we need
personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy for corporations, but bank-
ruptcy is a little dubious for cities, crazy for states, really crazy for
countries, and utterly absurd for the United States. The bigger the
debtor is, in a sense,27 the less suitable it is for bankruptcy. Many
25. See, e.g., Jackson & Skeel, supra note 24, at 445-46.
26. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
27. I say “in a sense” because some cities and possibly even states are not as large as the
largest corporations. Lehman Brothers reported much greater assets than Detroit in its
bankruptcy filing, though the numbers may be misleading. Compare Matt Hudgins, Lehman
Is Biding Its Time to Market Its Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 12, 2012, at B10, with Matthew
Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit: Motor City ‘Is Broke’ Governor Says, as It Seeks to
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of us might also note that cities, states, and countries are considered
to be sovereign in some respects, and bankruptcy seems un-
seemly—an assault on the dignity of a sovereign.
These intuitions are widespread, and they also seem to roughly
track the way American lawmakers think. But if we pick at them
even a little bit, they quickly stop making sense. Here are four
puzzles for the standard intuitions.
First, if it is obvious that we need bankruptcy for consumers who
are overwhelmed by debt, we would expect consumer bankruptcy
law to be ubiquitous. Perhaps some developing countries would be
an exception because they are often outliers in economic matters.
But we would expect consumer bankruptcy to be as ubiquitous in
the laws of developed countries as civil procedure, corporate, or
securities laws. Yet this is not what we find at all. Many developed
countries do not have any consumer bankruptcy provisions or offer
very limited access to bankruptcy. Although Italy has long had a
corporate insolvency framework, it did not provide either a collective
proceeding or a discharge for consumer debts until 2012.28 A handful
of other European countries still do not have a consumer bank-
ruptcy framework, and those countries that do have consumer
bankruptcy generally impose much tighter restrictions on discharge
than the United States.29 This variation raises questions as to
whether consumer bankruptcy is as inevitable as the U.S. experi-
ence tends to suggest.
Second puzzle. Given that cities and states come right after
corporations on the left-right spectrum, we might naturally assume
that the best way to explain why cities are—and to decide whether
states should be—permitted to file for bankruptcy is to compare
municipal or state bankruptcy to corporate bankruptcy. If distressed
states face the same issues as distressed corporations, they may
Restructure $18 Billion in Debt, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2013, at A1.
28. See, e.g., Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, The Paradoxical Bankruptcy Discharge: Rereading
the Common Law-Civil Law Relationship 11 n.15 (July 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2298486. 
29. For the range of approaches, see CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY—COM-
PARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3-4 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009); Rafael
Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81, 81-82 (2002); Iain
Ramsay, Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market: Approaches to Debt Adjustment and
Consumer Insolvency in the EU, 35 J. CONS. POL’Y 421, 421-22 (2012).
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need a bankruptcy framework. If not, bankruptcy is unnecessary.
This is, in fact, exactly how most scholars think.30 They start with
the standard scholarly explanation for corporate bankruptcy, which
emphasizes bankruptcy law’s ability to ensure that businesses are
not liquidated unnecessarily.31 When a business is in financial
trouble, the reasoning goes, its creditors will rush to get paid before
the money runs out. They may, for instance, foreclose on the
company’s manufacturing plant or its equipment,32 even though this
could destroy an otherwise viable business. Bankruptcy imposes a
cease fire, so that the debtor and its creditors can decide whether
the business is worth more alive than dead.33
When scholars apply this reasoning to states like Illinois or
California, they rightly conclude that states are quite different than
corporations. Unlike the creditors of a corporation, who can go to
court if the corporation refuses to pay, there is not much Illinois’s
creditors can do. Illinois is immune from most lawsuits because the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits litigation against a state.34 A
creditor cannot foreclose on the state house in Springfield or
demand the keys to a state park. To be sure, a mandamus remedy
is sometimes available, but states can easily avoid its effects if they
do not wish to comply.35 Although some people might wish that a
state could be liquidated if it stops paying its bills, this is not going
to happen.
This seems to suggest that state bankruptcy is a lousy idea.
But there is a small problem with this reasoning—it is based on
the wrong analogy. As strange as this sounds, states are actual-
ly a lot more like consumer debtors, like you and me, than like
30. These intuitions pervade the critiques of state bankruptcy by Adam Levitin and Anna
Gelpern, although each makes other arguments as well. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy,
Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 907 (2012); Adam J.
Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1433
(2012). 
31. Levitin, supra note 30, at 1433-34.
32. Cunningham v. Sizer Steel Corp., 1 F.2d 653, 653 (W.D.N.Y. 1924).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (setting forth bankruptcy’s “automatic stay” provision).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see, e.g., Levitin, supra note 30, at 1434.
35. See, e.g., ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNCIPAL DEBT FINANCE
LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 5.4.1 (1992) (describing states’ and municipalities’ ability to
evade mandamus actions); see also City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 212 P.2d 894, 898
(Cal. 1949).
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corporations.36 Why do consumers end up in financial trouble?
Usually the first step is that they overborrow, often because
consumers have a tendency to focus too much on the short-term
benefits of the borrowing and not enough on the long-term costs.37
If a consumer is overwhelmed by debt, we cannot simply liquidate
the consumer.38 States are very similar in both respects. Like
consumers, state lawmakers tend to focus too much on short-term
consequences,39 and they cannot realistically be liquidated.
If state bankruptcy is a good idea, it is because it offers the same
kinds of benefits as consumer bankruptcy, not because states are
similar to corporations. Once again, our intuitions about the left-
right continuum lead us astray. The disjunction would be consider-
ably less startling if the rationales for consumer and corporate
bankruptcy were the same. But they are quite different in tradi-
tional bankruptcy theory, as reflected in a perplexingly abrupt shift
in focus when the classic normative account of bankruptcy com-
pletes its analysis of corporate bankruptcy and takes up the
consumer discharge.40
Third puzzle. Municipalities can file for bankruptcy but states
cannot, which accords with our intuitions under the left-right
continuum. But the case for municipal bankruptcy is actually
weaker than it is for state bankruptcy. A state has extensive control
over its municipalities. It can limit their ability to borrow, change
their boundaries, and even liquidate them.41 State control makes
municipal bankruptcy less necessary than it would be in the
absence of these powers—not unnecessary, to be sure, but less
necessary. Because Congress does not have as sweeping powers over
36. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy
the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1074-76 (2013). 
37. Id. at 1074.
38. Current bankruptcy law protects not only the debtor, but also some of her assets. 11
U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1), 522(d) (providing exemptions certain debtors may use to protect property).
39. Skeel, supra note 36, at 1074.
40. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 225-26.
41. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L REV. 425, 481, 484-85, 487
(1993) (advocating the liquidation of insolvent municipalities under some circumstances);
Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The
Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1313 n.72.
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states as states have over their municipalities,42 the benefits of
bankruptcy are more pronounced for states than for municipalities.
One final puzzle. Most of us assume it would be an offense to the
dignity of a sovereign entity if it could be thrown into bankruptcy;43
this is one reason that bankruptcy seems odd to many people for
cities and unfathomable for states or countries. The further right we
go on the left-right continuum, it may seem, the greater an offense
bankruptcy would be. The extent of the entity’s sovereignty clearly
increases as we move from city to state, and from state to nation.
The potential offense to the entity’s dignity might seem to do
likewise.
Yet the sovereign dignity—or, as I will also call it, anti-harass-
ment—concern cuts both ways. If we prohibit a sovereign from being
thrown into involuntary bankruptcy, and allow only voluntary
bankruptcy—as the municipal bankruptcy laws currently do with
cities44—bankruptcy actually could enhance the dignity of the
sovereign under some circumstances. Argentina is a good example.
Argentina restructured much of its external debt through a highly
coercive exchange offer with its bondholders in 2005.45 But because
there is no such thing as sovereign bankruptcy—that is, bankruptcy
for countries—Argentina could not discharge its obligations to
creditors that refused to agree to its restructuring. Although
Argentina made clear that it has no intention ever to make any
payments to these holdout creditors,46 its obligations to the holdouts
have not disappeared. They still are due and owing. The holdout
creditors have been harassing Argentina47 and grabbing every asset
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
43. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 460 (2004) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (state authorization); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating
§ 301, which provides for voluntary filings, into Chapter 9, but not § 303, which allows
involuntary filings).
45. For a brief chronology of Argentina’s dealings with its creditors, see Patrick Bolton &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177,
193-94 (2005).
46. Argentina went so far as to pass a law—known as the Padlock Law—prohibiting the
nation from paying holdouts. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A
HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 128 (2013).
47. See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Hedge Funds Win Ruling in Argentina Bond Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/hedge-funds-win-ruling-in-argentina-
bond-case/?_r=0.
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they can find outside of Argentina. In 2012, for instance, they seized
an Argentine ship called Libertad (which means “freedom,”
ironically enough).48 In 2013, they won a very surprising victory in
the Second Circuit, which held that Argentina cannot pay the
bondholders who agreed to have their bonds restructured unless it
also pays the holdouts.49 Even more dramatically, the Second Circuit
also suggested that the institutions that handle Argentina’s
payments, not Argentina alone, may also be responsible for these
obligations.50 Argentina may be able to evade these rulings by
routing all of its payments outside of the United States. But the
rulings have created a major headache for Argentina.
I personally do not think anyone should cry for Argentina—it
behaved badly throughout its financial distress—but an orderly
bankruptcy process would have shown more respect for Argentina’s
sovereignty than the permanent harassment it ended up facing.
Absent bankruptcy, Argentina—and any country in a similar
predicament—faces the prospect that hedge funds and other
investors will pester it all over the world.
It would not be difficult to identify other puzzles, but these four
should suffice to demonstrate the shortcomings of the left-to-right
continuum. Its flaws are severe enough to justify starting from
scratch and developing a different framework for thinking about
bankruptcy. For the remainder of this Article, that is what I propose
to do.
III. WHEN DOES BANKRUPTCY WORK?: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
In the discussion that follows, I will offer a five-part typology for
assessing whether a bankruptcy framework makes sense in any giv-
en context. Much of the novelty in this approach comes not from the
individual parts of the typology, but from bringing factors that are
usually confined to a limited context—some to consumer bankruptcy,
48. See, e.g., id.
49. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 2013).
50. Id. at 243 (“[A]mended injunctions simply provide notice to payment system
participants that they could become liable through Rule 65 if they assist Argentina in
violating the district court’s orders.”).
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others to corporate insolvency or sovereign debt—together into a
single framework. For those who like to know where the story is
headed, the five factors are: (1) unsustainable debt; (2) the benefits
(and costs) of reshaping decision-making incentives; (3) the risk of
premature liquidation; (4) the dignity of the debtor; and (5) spillover
effects.
A. Unsustainable Debt
The first of the factors, unsustainable debt, is, in a sense, a
gatekeeper for the remaining four. If debtors have or may have
unsustainable debt, bankruptcy may be an appropriate solution. But
if such debt is not an issue, either because debtors have no or
limited debt, or because they have a near certain means of repay-
ment, there is no need to continue. We can simply conclude that
bankruptcy is unnecessary.
Start with the first of the two circumstances in which unsustain-
able debt is not a serious concern. If an individual or entity cannot
borrow, or if its borrowing is strictly limited, bankruptcy is not
likely to be necessary or useful. Many of us use this principle with
our children—we do not lend them money, or lend the money in
such small amounts that repayment is assured. This also explains
why many countries do not have personal bankruptcy laws. If it is
very difficult to borrow, it will likely be a lot less important that you
give consumers a fresh start. In the contemporary world, the
principal litmus test is credit cards. If you meet a visitor from a
foreign country, and learn—thanks to your audacity or their
brashness—that they do not have any credit cards, you can be fairly
sure the country they are from either does not provide a discharge
for consumer debtors or makes it very hard to get.51
Most countries that limit consumer borrowing do not adopt the
same attitude with business debt. But in theory they could. Some
religious traditions discourage the use of debt, and there have been
51. Countries with a generous social safety net also tend to restrict the bankruptcy
discharge. For a discussion of some of the tradeoffs between bankruptcy and the social safety
net, see Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 284-85 (1995).
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serious proposals for eliminating or severely curbing debt.52 The fact
that they are nonstarters in the developed world should not blind us
to their existence elsewhere. Indeed, a similar impulse has recently
entered discussions about regulating systemically important
financial institutions. Concerned about the consequences of a giant
bank failure, some commentators propose that the biggest banks be
required to hold large amounts of equity to reduce the debt in their
capital structure.53 At the levels usually discussed, the banks would
be far less likely to fail, but failure would still be possible and a
bankruptcy framework still necessary.54 But if the equity require-
ment were so stiff that it removed the risk of default, the need for
bankruptcy would disappear as well.55
Even if an individual or entity can borrow, bankruptcy still will
be unnecessary if there is little or no risk that the debtor will not be
able to repay. States and countries—and, to a more limited extent,
municipalities—may be able to use their taxing authority to
generate sufficient funds to pay off even high levels of debt.
California is a current illustration. In 2010, in the midst of the
recent recession, California’s debts appeared to be unsustainable.56
Since then, the state has imposed higher taxes and has eliminated
52. Scholars associated with the Jubilee Center in Cambridge, England have advocated
a radical rethinking of debt. See, e.g., Paul Mills, The Great Financial Crisis: A Biblical
Diagnosis, JUBILEE CENTRE: CAMBRIDGE PAPERS (Mar. 2011), http://www.jubilee-centre.org/
document.php?id=414.
53. The most vocal advocates of this strategy are Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig. ANAT
ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 179 (2013).
54. Recall that bankruptcy as I have defined it includes bank resolution. See supra
Part I.
55. In his writing, Barry Adler has emphasized the possibility of a “world without debt”
and explored some of the consequences. Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 811, 811-12, 815-18 (1994). It is perhaps worth noting that the discussion in the text has
taken the conditions of the credit markets as a given and, thus, has assumed that these
conditions preceded the question of whether to put bankruptcy laws in place. In reality, it is
also possible for the bankruptcy laws to come first and to shape credit decisions and credit
markets. In my view, treating credit markets as coming first, and the decision whether to
provide a bankruptcy option second, is nevertheless sensible. This has typically been the
pattern in practice. For a similar argument about laws protecting minority shareholders in
corporate law, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 7
(2001).
56. David A. Skeel , Jr., Give the States a Way to Go Bankrupt , WEEKLY STANDARD
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt_518
378.html?nopager=1.
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its annual deficit.57 Although California still has significant
structural deficits, few expect the state to default in the near or
intermediate term.58 In addition to or as an alternative to tax
revenues, many countries can simply print money—at least so long
as they do not trigger runaway inflation—to pay their debt. This is
what the United States has been doing throughout the recent
financial crisis. The effectiveness of these solutions is different for
different kinds of entities. American states can raise taxes, for
instance, but they cannot print money because the Constitution
forbids this.59 The risk that a state will be overwhelmed by its debt
is therefore greater than the risk that the United States will be.
The principal cost of unsustainable debt is that it stifles growth.60
An individual whose debt is overwhelming may lose her incentive
to work because any proceeds will go straight to the maws of her
creditors. For similar reasons, a business or state may find itself
unable to raise the funds it needs to pursue investments that might
otherwise benefit both its creditors and itself. Bankruptcy is not
necessarily the only solution to these problems. The debtor may be
able to negotiate a private restructuring with key creditors, or it
may devise ways of raising the necessary funds—such as project
finance—that do not require bankruptcy.61 If these other options are
likely to be sufficient, bankruptcy may be unnecessary even for
debtors that have unsustainable debt. Indeed, the absence of a
bankruptcy option may reshape the debtor’s attitude toward
borrowing, making it less likely that unsustainable debt will be an
issue. Otherwise, the prospect of unsustainable debt will weigh
strongly in favor of bankruptcy.
57. John Avlon, Jerry Brown Creates California Surplus Miracle, But Can It Last?,
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 15, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/15/jerry-
brown-creates-california-surplus-miracle-but-can-it-last.html.
58. Mary Williams Walsh, State Debt Woes Grow Too Big to Camouflage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2010, at A1.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from coining money).
60. The bankruptcy literature generally describes the dilemma as a “debt overhang”
problem. Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown & Paul Pfleiderer, Liability Holding Companies,
59 UCLA L. REV. 852, 868 (2012). The classic analysis is Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 154 (1977).
61. See generally STEFANO GATTI, PROJECT FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007).
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B. Reshaping Decision-Making Incentives
A second factor is bankruptcy’s effect on the parties’ decision-
making incentives. Bankruptcy can reshape decision making in two
different ways. First, and most obvious, it can shift decision-making
authority from one constituency to another. This is most evident
with corporations and other business debtors. Prior to bankruptcy,
shareholders or other equity holders control the decision-making
process.62 Bankruptcy shifts decision-making authority away from
equity holders and puts it in the hands of creditors.63 Because equity
holders’ decision-making incentives are distorted when a business
is in financial distress, this shift is an important benefit of corporate
bankruptcy.64
Bankruptcy’s second effect on decision making stems from its
discharge of a debtor’s obligations to general creditors. The prospect
that the debtor’s obligations will be reduced alters the parties’
decision-making incentives in several different ways. Ex post, the
prospect of debt reduction may give a debtor too great an incentive
to file for bankruptcy—a phenomenon known as moral hazard. The
benefits of reducing unsustainable debt therefore must be compared
to the potential costs of moral hazard.
The prospect of restructuring has ex ante effects as well. Credi-
tors can be expected to monitor the debtor more carefully and to
tighten their credit terms if debtors can discharge some or all of
their obligations in bankruptcy. If creditors are good monitors and
the risk of moral hazard is low, bankruptcy’s effect on decision-
making incentives will weigh in favor of bankruptcy. If creditors are
poor monitors or moral hazard is a major concern, bankruptcy may
be more problematic.
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2013) (detailing shareholder election
of directors at annual meetings); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(describing directors’ responsibility to shareholders). 
63. In some countries, bankruptcy also displaces the managers of a corporate debtor and
puts a government-appointed trustee or other new decision maker in charge. In the United
States, managers presumptively remain in place. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012).
64. If the company is insolvent or nearly so, shareholders have an incentive to take even
crazy gambles; they are not entitled to anything if the company shuts down, but if the gamble
pays off, their stock may be worth something again. See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond
Insolvency, 62 KANSAS L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
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Personal bankruptcy is a good illustration of this second set of
decision-making effects. Although the decision maker does not
change, bankruptcy gives creditors an incentive to monitor the
debtor’s borrowing, which puts more of the burden of excessive
borrowing on creditors and less on the social safety net.65 Bank-
ruptcy can (or would) have a somewhat similar effect with a
municipality or state, especially with respect to pensions, as I will
discuss more fully in the next Part. If such a debtor can restructure
its pension obligations in bankruptcy, the beneficiaries and their
representatives have an incentive to pay more attention to whether
the promises are sustainable. They may put more pressure on
politicians to fully fund the pensions than they do in a world where
pensions cannot be altered.66
C. Preventing Premature Liquidation
As I have already noted, one of the principal benefits of bank-
ruptcy for corporations is that it prevents disorderly liquidation.67
If we did not have corporate bankruptcy, the creditors of a corpora-
tion might destroy its value by forcing the sale of key assets in their
race to make sure they got paid before it was too late.68 Not all
insolvent firms should be liquidated; there is a well recognized
distinction between economic failure (a firm should be shuttered)
and financial failure (liabilities exceed assets).69 Sometimes, the
assets are being used in their highest and best use. It would,
therefore, be inefficient to let creditors, lacking a coordination
mechanism, pull the firm apart, “saving” a few creditors that are
fleet enough to grab assets or payment, but imposing costs on the
creditors as a group.70 By halting creditors’ individual efforts to
collect what they are owed and providing a collective proceeding for
resolving the debtor’s financial distress, bankruptcy can prevent
65. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 231.
66. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 701 (2012);
Skeel, supra note 36, at 1072-74.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
68. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 10-19.
69. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1993).
70. Id.
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premature liquidation and preserve value. This feature of bank-
ruptcy lies at the heart of the creditors’ bargain theory—the classic
normative justification for corporate bankruptcy.71
The extent to which bankruptcy is needed to prevent premature
liquidation is hotly contested in the corporate bankruptcy
literature.72 But this feature is central to the case for corporate
bankruptcy—especially in the United States.73 By contrast, if
premature liquidation is not a threat, the case for bankruptcy is
weaker.
D. The Dignity of the Debtor
Although bankruptcy experts talk a lot about my first three
factors, very few talk about the fourth—dignity, and related anti-
humiliation concerns.74 Perhaps this is because dignity stands in a
more ambiguous relationship to efficiency than the prior factors.75
Or maybe this is because dignity is a less prominent concern in the
corporate bankruptcies that garner most scholars’ attention than
with other financially distressed debtors. But dignity is crucially
important to understanding when bankruptcy is, and is not, a good
idea.
In the ancient world, dignity was a key theme in laws concerning
debtor-creditor relations. In the Bible, Israel’s creditors were
instructed to release their debtors from servitude every seven years
and to forgive all debts every fifty years in the Jubilee.76 This was
one of the world’s first bankruptcy laws, and one of its major
objectives was to protect the dignity of debtors.77 Enslavement for
71. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 858-60 (1982) (describing creditors’ bargain theory).
72. For arguments that collective action problems are not inevitable, see Adler, supra note
69; Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
645, 647-48 (1992).
73. See Adler, supra note 69, at 311.
74. Anna Gelpern is an exception. Gelpern, supra note 30, at 928-30 (discussing autonomy
concerns).
75. It is perhaps worth noting that the fresh start in consumer bankruptcy has
traditionally been explained in both dignitarian and efficiency terms. It provides relief for the
“honest but unfortunate” debtor, while also addressing debt overhang concerns.
76. Leviticus 25:1-22.
77. Id.
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debt was recognized as a great indignity. I think it is no accident
that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished involuntary servitude for
debt as part of the same amendment that abolished slavery.78
To be sure, the extent to which bankruptcy enhances dignity
depends on the terms of the bankruptcy law. Harsh bankruptcy
laws can actually interfere with a debtor’s dignity. This is why, in
the United States, debtors were the principal opponents of bank-
ruptcy for most of the nineteenth century.79 Although Alexander
Hamilton favored bankruptcy, Thomas Jefferson hated the idea.80
But for over a century, and even after the 2005 changes, American
bankruptcy has been very generous to debtors and, as a result,
promotes, rather than interferes with, dignity.81
The contours of the dignity factor are difficult to define precisely.
This is in part because conceptions of dignity have evolved in some
respects, much as our perceptions of what constitutes “cruel and
unusual” punishment have evolved. Dignity also is understood
somewhat differently in different countries.82 In the U.S., constitu-
tional constraints such as the Thirteenth Amendment provide a
baseline level of protection. For individuals, the question raised by
the dignity factor is whether potentially humiliating circumstances
that do not violate the constitution’s protections of liberty and
equality, such as the long-term effects of unsustainable debt,
warrant bankruptcy relief.83
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; A.O. Scott, A President Engaged In a Great Civil
War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at C1, C10.
79. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 26-27 (2001) (“[S]outherners feared that northern creditors would use bankruptcy
law as a collective device to displace southern farmers.”).
80. Jefferson’s antipathy was reflected in his successful campaign to repeal America’s first
bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Id. at 3-4.
81. The initial shift came with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, whose
concessions to the concerns of debtors changed the tenor of American bankruptcy law. For a
discussion of the political economy of the 1898 Act, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 336-38 (1999).
82. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (contrasting German and French concern with image,
name, and reputation with American focus on liberty from the state).
83. For an argument that the Supreme Court has become less open to equality-based
constitutional law arguments and more welcoming to liberty-based dignitarian claims, see
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
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For sovereign and quasi-sovereign debtors, the dignity factor is
equally subtle. For U.S. municipalities and states, dignity-related
concerns are shaped by constitutional protections of state sovereign-
ty such as the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.84 For countries, the
baseline is set by conceptions of sovereignty. But anti-humiliation
concerns can arise even if—perhaps especially if—a country has
waived its sovereign immunity with regard to some obligations,
such as its bond debt. The prospect that a state or country could be
thrown into bankruptcy involuntarily, for instance, would raise
significant anti-humiliation concerns. This is one reason almost no
one advocates involuntary bankruptcy for cities, states, or
countries.85 Even if only the debtor itself could invoke the bank-
ruptcy provisions, bankruptcy can have negative dignity effects, a
point some commentators have made about Detroit’s bankruptcy.86
Yet a bankruptcy framework for countries like Argentina could
enhance dignity if it removed the threat of perpetual harassment by
unhappy creditors.87 Dignity has come into play in similarly
complicated ways in the recent bankruptcies of Catholic church
dioceses in the wake of its clergy misconduct scandals.88 Filing for
bankruptcy had highly negative effects on the dioceses’ dignity, yet
filing also enabled the dioceses and the clergy misconduct victims to
reach settlements.89
We cannot, however, simply consider the dignity-enhancing ben-
efits of bankruptcy in isolation. A bankruptcy law that is generous
84. Courts’ extreme reluctance to force states to levy taxes to pay bond debts, even in
contexts where mandamus would not violate the Tenth or Eleventh Amendment, can be seen
as a response to anti-humiliation considerations. For a history of bond defaults and
bondholders’ efforts to collect, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987). 
85. For U.S. cities and states, Tenth Amendment state sovereignty concerns are another
reason. But sovereign bankruptcy theoretically could include an involuntary filing option, and
at least one commentator advocates involuntary bankruptcy for states. Adam Feibelman,
Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 81-82, 94-
96 (2012).
86. These general dignity concerns are inseparable from concerns about the racial
implications of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., Andrew O’Hehir, Why the Right Hates
Detroit, SALON (July 27, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/27/why_the_right_
hates_detroit/. 
87. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
88. The most extensive analysis of the church bankruptcies is Jonathan C. Lipson, When
Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2006). 
89. I discuss church bankruptcy in more detail below. See infra Part IV.B.
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to debtors, and thus enhances their dignity, may also create moral
hazard—the temptation to break financial promises if this can be
done with impunity or at little cost—thus creating problematic
decision-making incentives. Although it is easiest to see this with
consumer debtors, the concern also applies to corporations, espe-
cially nonprofits, and even more to cities, states, and countries.90
E. Spillover Effects
During the recent 2008 recession, there was a great deal of
discussion about the risk that the ordinary bankruptcy process can
cause destructive externalities—spillover effects on third parties. If
General Motors and Chrysler had not been bailed out, the argument
went, all of their suppliers would have also failed, and more than a
million jobs would have been lost in the Midwest.91 Regulators and
others have said that if the investment bank, Bear Stearns, or the
insurance company, AIG, had filed for bankruptcy, the financial
system would have collapsed, to the detriment of every American
citizen.92 Many of these claims were exaggerated, but that is not my
concern here. Of greater importance for the purposes of this Article
is the general relationship between bankruptcy and spillover effects.
If a bankruptcy framework would cause problematic spillovers, this
will weigh against creating a bankruptcy option; if bankruptcy
reduces or removes these effects, it may be desirable on balance.
The first thing we need to do is determine which spillover effects
are caused by bankruptcy and which are not. The “single point of
entry” strategy that the FDIC has developed for implementing the
Dodd-Frank Act’s rules for resolving systemically important
financial institutions is a useful avenue into this question.93 In a
90. Concerns about increased moral hazard were a frequent objection to the IMF ’s sov-
ereign bankruptcy proposal in the early 2000s. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor
Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657, 661-63 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Editorial, A Million Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at SR10 (crediting the
bailouts with creating or saving 1.45 million jobs, based on a study by the Center for
Automotive Research).
92. This theme, and the contention that Lehman should not have been permitted to file
for bankruptcy, is pervasive in the popular writing about the 2008 crisis. See, e.g., DAVID
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 2-3, 5, 8, 25-26 (2009).
93. The single point of entry strategy is described in detail in a report issued by the
Bipartisan Policy Center. John F. Bovenzi et al., Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution,
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single point of entry resolution, the FDIC would put only the
holding company—the uppermost corporate entity—into resolu-
tion.94 None of the subsidiaries would be put into resolution, except
perhaps those that were deeply insolvent.95 After putting the
holding company into resolution, the FDIC would immediately
transfer its assets, short-term liabilities, and secured debt to a new
bridge institution, leaving the stock and long-term unsecured debt
behind in the old entity.96 The new entity would be a recapitalized
version of the old financial institution.97 The FDIC believes that this
approach will minimize the risk of spillover effects, such as a run by
the institution’s short term lenders in the event a systemically
important financial institution falls into distress.98 As the FDIC sees
it, a key advantage as compared to traditional bankruptcy is that
the FDIC can act quickly.99 The FDIC also is not required to focus
solely on the troubled institution itself; regulators can take actions,
such as pumping capital or assets from the parent corporation to a
troubled subsidiary, that would not be permitted in an ordinary
bankruptcy case.100 Finally, the FDIC has access to a great deal of
funding, which further reduces the risk of panic runs, and it can
step in much more quickly than a bankruptcy court could.101
Two of the three factors identified by the FDIC as problematic are
features of particular U.S. bankruptcy laws, rather than inherent
to bankruptcy. If Congress converted Chapter 11 from a judicial
framework to an administrative one and provided access to govern-
mental funding, the bankruptcy system would likely have the same
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 58-70 (2013), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/TooBigTo
Fail.pdf. 
94. Id. at 63.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 64.
97. Id. at 65.
98. Id. at 65-66.
99. Id. at 69. This advantage of administrative resolution, and the advantages in the text
that follows, are described in Jackson & Skeel, supra note 24, at 445.
100. Bovenzi et al., supra note 93, at 65.
101. Id. at 66. Under Section 210(n) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC is authorized to
borrow up to 10 percent of the book value of the institution as of the time it is taken over and
90 percent of its value in resolution. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 1506-09 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5390).
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features as FDIC resolution. Indeed, as discussed earlier, FDIC
resolution is a form of bankruptcy.102
The one factor that does reach closer to the heart of bankruptcy
is its focus on maximizing the value of the assets of the debtor—a
single individual or entity—rather than on systemic effects. It is
quite possible to create a bankruptcy framework that invites the
decision maker to consider spillover effects, even when doing so does
not maximize the value of the debtor’s assets. It also seems clear
that an awareness of possible spillover effects influences bankruptcy
judges’ decision making in particular cases. But these are depar-
tures from the bankruptcy paradigm, rather than a traditional
feature of bankruptcy.
The other feature of bankruptcy that can cause spillover effects
is the cessation of payments to creditors, together with the likeli-
hood that a debtor’s general creditors will not be paid in full. It is
important to recognize that this effect is not unique to bankruptcy:
a debtor that defaults outside of bankruptcy also halts payments
and imposes losses. The principal contrast here is to a bailout in
which some, or all, of the debtor’s shareholders and creditors are
protected.103 If AIG had not been bailed out and had defaulted on its
derivatives obligations, regulators have argued, its counterparties
would have been destabilized and the confidence crisis of late 2008
would have been far worse.104 If New York City had filed for
bankruptcy in 1975, the municipal bond market would have
collapsed and cities all over the country would have been unable to
borrow.105 In each case, a bailout avoided the contagion effects that
bankruptcy might have unleashed. If the likelihood of contagion is
pervasive, this factor will weigh against putting a bankruptcy
framework in place.
102. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
103. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 35, at 285.
104. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-003, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG
COUNTERPARTIES 1 (2009) (describing fears that disorderly AIG bankruptcy would “cause
systemic risk to the entire financial system and the American retirement system”). 
105. See generally MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF NEW YORK CITY (1985) (discussing the implications of New York City’s financial
crisis in the 1970s).
2242 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2217
In the contexts we have considered thus far, bankruptcy is—or is
thought to be—a source of spillover effects. In other contexts,
bankruptcy can have precisely the opposite effect, preventing,
rather than causing, spillover effects. By allowing consumers to file
for bankruptcy, we reduce the burden that their financial distress
may impose on their relatives and friends.106 In the days of debtors’
prisons, these spillovers were welcomed. Creditors hoped that
putting a debtor in prison would increase the likelihood that his
creditors would be paid because the debtor’s destitution put
pressure on family and friends to help pay the debtor’s
obligations.107 The abolition of debtors’ prisons reduced this spillover
effect of an individual’s financial distress somewhat; the bankruptcy
discharge removes it almost entirely.
In the sovereign context, bankruptcy could reduce the burdens
that today’s borrowing imposes on future generations—what
economists call intergenerational wealth transfers.108 Odious debt
doctrine is based on similar principles, removing the responsibility
of a country and its citizens for debts that were incurred illegiti-
mately by a prior regime.109 Sovereign bankruptcy would reduce a
future generation’s responsibility for debts that were legitimately
incurred as well. State bankruptcy could have a somewhat similar
effect. If we allowed states to file for bankruptcy, bankruptcy might
reduce the burdens that current borrowing imposes on future
citizens.
Although state (or sovereign) bankruptcy could remove one source
of spillovers, critics worry that it also could create the kinds of
contagion problems discussed earlier.110 State bankruptcy thus
106. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 243-44.
107. See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
INDEPENDENCE 78-80 (2002).
108. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Karl Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the
Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 145-47 (1994) (discussing wealth transfers
and their effect on subsequent generations).
109. I am using the term “doctrine” loosely. Whether odious debt doctrine is indeed doctrine
in international law is debatable. For an excellent historical overview and discussion of the
doctrine’s current status, see Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The
Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007).
110. See, e.g., Thomas P. DiNapoli, Letter to the Editor, Even Talk of Bankruptcy Is a Bad
Solution for States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011, at A16 (arguing that the creation of a state
bankruptcy regime would negatively affect even a fiscally responsible state’s access to capital
markets).
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promises to reduce one potential spillover effect, but could in theory
create a different one. Both effects need to be taken into account in
any consideration of whether states should be permitted to file for
bankruptcy.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK IN ACTION: THREE APPLICATIONS
My claim, then, is that rather than just assuming that the bigger
or more sovereign-like the entity is, the less sense bankruptcy
makes, we can reach much more sensible decisions by considering
the factors I have just described, and comparing bankruptcy to the
other plausible alternatives; this may include private renegotia-
tions, simply defaulting, or a bailout. In the discussion that follows,
I will offer three simple applications, each of which illustrates the
benefits of the typology outlined in the last Part.
A. City Versus State Bankruptcy
The first application involves the decision whether cities and
states should be permitted to file for bankruptcy. Under current
law, cities can file for bankruptcy, but states cannot.111 Most people
think this is about right. According to conventional wisdom,
bankruptcy is sometimes appropriate for small municipalities, but
it is much more problematic for larger public entities.112 This im-
plies that it is ill-advised for states. Yet the five-factor framework
suggests that this conclusion may be backwards, or at the least, that
bankruptcy makes even more sense for states than for cities.
The key distinction is that cities are subject to significant control
by the state.113 The state can limit a city’s taxing ability and can
restrict its ability to take on debt.114 The state can even dissolve and
reconfigure a city.115 Although states do not usually exercise these
powers, they could. Indeed, a conspiracy theory, which made the
rounds in some circles after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, speculated
111. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012) (limiting chapter 9 bankruptcy to municipalities).
112. See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 8, at 360.
113. See Skeel, supra note 36, at 1078.
114. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 908-09 (2003).
115. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1376-77 (2012).
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that Michigan (or less plausibly, the Obama administration) would
dissolve the boundaries between Detroit and the wealthy suburbs
around it, and thus force the suburbs to help address Detroit’s
financial distress.116 Strict state control, especially if it came before
any of the state’s municipalities fell into distress, would make most
of the usual functions of bankruptcy less necessary.
None of this is true if the state itself is in financial distress. The
strongest argument against bankruptcy for states is that, even
though Congress has much less control over the states than the
states have over their cities, a state’s ability to cut spending and
raise taxes, and to restructure some of its obligations outside of
bankruptcy, will enable it to muddle through any financial crisis,117
as California appears to be doing now.118 If this is true, states’ debt
is never truly unsustainable. But the states’ ability to tax is far from
unlimited. Ever since the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized
a federal income tax, was added to the Constitution in 1913, federal
taxation has crowded out state taxation to some extent.119 This
means that states may not always be able to tax their way out of a
debt crisis.
If we look at the five factors outlined in the last Part, one of the
factors—disorderly liquidation—is not an issue for states because
states cannot be liquidated. But each of the other factors favors
bankruptcy. The first and third factors—unsustainable debt and
bankruptcy’s reshaping of decision making—are best illustrated by
the public pension crisis that is most severe in Illinois, but is also a
looming catastrophe in other states.120 A number of states, including
Illinois, preclude any significant restructuring of the pension
benefits of existing employees outside of bankruptcy.121 Although
116. For an earlier suggestion that dissolution be considered, see State Senator Proposes
Dissolving City of Detroit, CBS DETROIT (Nov. 28, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/
2012/11/28/state-senator-proposes-dissolving-city-of-detroit/.
117. E.J. McMahon, Opinion, State Bankruptcy Is a Bad Idea, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011,
at A17.
118. See Avlon, supra note 57.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
120. See Mary Williams Walsh, Ratings Service Finds Pension Shortfall, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2013, at B1, B7.
121. See Steven Yaccino, Governor of Illinois Tells Legislators Pension Costs Put State at
‘Critical Junction’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2013, at A16. The best analysis of states’ differing
levels of protection of pension obligations is Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform:
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the funded portion might be fully protected in a state bankruptcy
framework, the unfunded portions probably would be subject to
restructuring.122 Not only would state bankruptcy provide an
alternative to simply defaulting on the state pension if a state is
incapable of paying its obligations; but also the prospect that
unsustainable obligations could be restructured in bankruptcy
would give public employee unions a greater incentive to push for
full funding of the state’s pension promises and to monitor the
state’s financial health.123 The existence of a state bankruptcy
framework could thus improve states’ handling of their pension
obligations.
The final two factors also weigh in favor of state bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy discharge would protect a state’s dignity interest by
cutting off the relentless creditor collection efforts that have made
Argentina miserable,124 and bankruptcy would limit the spillover
effects of a state’s overborrowing on future generations.125 Although
state bankruptcy theoretically could cause spillover effects in the
state bond markets, this seems unlikely given the market’s ability
to distinguish between financially healthy states and more troubled
ones.126 Indeed, the existence of a state bankruptcy option could
even increase the value of bonds issued by healthy states because
they are unlikely to default and do not benefit from the implicit
bailout subsidy that inflates the value of the bonds of financially
troubled states.
B. Corporations
The second application is to corporations. Corporations seem to
be the easiest case for a formal bankruptcy option, as the long
history of, and highly developed theoretical literature on, corporate
The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POLICY 617 (2010).
122. I have analyzed the question of whether public pensions can be restructured in much
more detail elsewhere. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Pensions be Restructured in (Detroit’s)
Municipal Bankruptcy?, FED SOC. WHITE PAPER SERIES (Oct. 2013); Skeel, supra note 36, at
1072-74. 
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part III.E.
126. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 36, at 1068-69.
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bankruptcy suggests. If a corporation is highly indebted, it may be
unable to raise financing even if it has very promising projects.127
Bankruptcy can address the problem of excessive debt.128 It also
counteracts the decision-making distortions that accompany
financial distress by shifting decision making authority from
shareholders to creditors.129 By providing a collective forum for the
resolution of financial distress, bankruptcy can also prevent an
unnecessary liquidation.130
The fourth factor, dignity, is only a little more subtle. For most
corporations, bankruptcy does not impose serious dignity costs,
especially given that firms that file for bankruptcy are already in
financial distress. Although American corporations once had close
links to the states that issued their charters, and thus partook of
the state’s sovereign dignity,131 they are almost entirely private
today.132 Even when dignity does seem to be at stake, the dignity
dimension is often smaller than it might initially seem. As General
Motors faltered in 2008 and 2009, there was considerable talk about
the consequences to an iconic American business of filing for
bankruptcy. These were in part dignitary concerns, but the larger
issue was concerns about whether consumers would buy cars from
a bankrupt carmaker.133 These were issues of reputation and
viability—how GM was perceived by the marketplace—rather than
dignity. With more ordinary corporations, dignity will not be a
127. See, e.g., Peter Tufano, Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial
Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 6-7
(1997).
128. See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (describing railroad receivership, the first American reorganization
device, as a solution to debt overhang).
129. Baird and Jackson were among the first in the theoretical literature to identify the
importance of shifting control. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the
Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 762 & n.58 (1988).
130. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 20, 186-88.
131. See, e.g., JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the
U.S., in 2 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 3, 149-53, 186-215
(2006) (describing the use of corporations to achieve governmental functions such as building
bridges or roads).
132. Frank René López, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy After
September 11: Profits, Freedom, and Human Rights, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 746 (2004).
133. Indeed, then-CEO Rick Wagoner couched his refusal to file for bankruptcy in these
terms, insisting that no one would buy cars from a bankrupt automaker. See, e.g., Bob
Sechler, Wagoner Says GM Won’t File for Bankruptcy or Reduce Brands, WALL ST. J., July 11,
2008, at B10.
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major factor, and bankruptcy is as likely to protect dignity as
undermine it—not least if it prevents a chaotic liquidation. Finally,
spillover effects are rarely a serious concern with a troubled
corporation. All five factors thus counsel in favor of a bankruptcy
option for corporations.
Yet the case for corporate bankruptcy that I have just outlined
assumes that the corporation has lots of creditors and that bank-
ruptcy is needed to shift decision-making authority. If most
corporations in a country did not have these characteristics,
bankruptcy might not be necessary. At least until recently, Japan
was a good illustration. Even large Japanese corporations only had
one or a small group of major creditors—usually banks134—and the
bankruptcy option was extremely limited. It was not hard to
imagine simply eliminating bankruptcy because these creditors
already had control when a corporation fell into financial distress
and they were in a position to prevent an unnecessary or disorderly
liquidation.135
Churches—and to some extent, other nonprofit corporations—are
a different kind of test for the assumption that a bankruptcy option
always makes sense for corporations. Churches differ from other
corporations in important ways, several of which are closely linked
with the dignity factor. The first factor, unsustainable debt, can be
seen as weighing in favor of bankruptcy for churches, but less so
than with other debtors. A church’s borrowing needs tend to be
limited,136 and the consequences of excessive debt usually do not
require a bankruptcy solution.137 With the second factor, reshaping
decision-making incentives, we theoretically could create a bank-
ruptcy option that shifted all decision-making authority to creditors
or a third party if a church filed for bankruptcy, but this would
134. See Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency:
A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 139, 159
(2007).
135. Note that Adler has made somewhat similar points about liquidation. See Adler, supra
note 69, at 311, 313-14. If bankruptcy was unnecessary, why does Japan have it? One reason
is that the then-current version of U.S. bankruptcy law was imposed after World War II. See
Wood, supra note 134, at 158.
136. Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy: An Examination of the
Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 839, 842 (2005).
137. Id. at 839.
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offend the dignity concerns reflected in the First Amendment
religion clauses.138 The possibility of church bankruptcy can
indirectly shape decision making, but this seems less important
than with consumer debtors or state politicians, because the
decision-making incentives of church leaders are less systematically
distorted.139 The final factor, spillover effects, may weigh slightly in
favor of a bankruptcy option. A church’s financial distress, for
instance, may interfere with the services it provides to the poor. But
these spillovers are likely to be relatively minor.
The case for church bankruptcy rests primarily on the third and
fourth factors. Although premature liquidation is also less of a risk
with churches in most instances, because churches are less depend-
ent on particular assets than ordinary corporations, the recent
diocesan bankruptcies demonstrated that premature liquidation can
sometimes be a genuine threat. In the absence of bankruptcy, the
clergy misconduct victims who sued first might have been paid,
leaving little or nothing for those who sued later. The diocesan
bankruptcies were unprecedented; premature liquidation is not a
serious risk with most churches. But these bankruptcies have made
clear that premature liquidation can sometimes be a serious
problem, which weighs in favor of a bankruptcy option.
Dignity concerns also weigh in favor of bankruptcy. Although a
bankruptcy filing can be seen as interfering with the dignity of a
church, by subjecting it to intrusive oversight, it can also protect
church dignity by limiting creditor harassment, much as with a
country like Argentina.140 Current U.S. bankruptcy law—which
authorizes voluntary bankruptcy filings but does not allow creditors
to throw a church into bankruptcy involuntarily141—together with
138. The Supreme Court has interpreted the religion clauses to prohibit it from even
attempting to interpret church doctrine, much less replacing church decision makers. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
139. Church leaders are more likely than politicians to serve for long periods of time, for
instance, and most churches do not rely heavily on debt finance.
140. Because most religious organizations do not rely on debt financing nearly as much as
countries do, even this factor is relatively unimportant in most cases. The clergy scandals in
the Catholic church were thus highly unusual—although this does not justify ignoring the
possibility of other catastrophes.
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012); Andrew Stone Mayo, Comment, For God and Money:
The Place of the Megachurch Within the Bankruptcy Code, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 609, 609
(2011).
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the First Amendment, minimizes the negative dignity effects of
bankruptcy while facilitating the positive ones.
Overall, the case for church bankruptcy is weaker than for other
corporations, but the bankruptcy option seems warranted on
balance.142
C. The Crisis in Europe
The final application is the recent crisis in Europe. Starting with
the escalation of Greece’s financial crisis four years ago—and
continuing as concerns grew about Ireland, Spain, Portugal and
Italy—commentators began asking whether Europe needed a
sovereign bankruptcy framework.143 As noted earlier, the architect
of the IMF’s proposed restructuring framework advocated a
variation of her original proposal for Europe.144 Would such a
framework make sense?
I saved the European application for last in the hope that some
readers will be prepared by this point to consider the possibility that
bankruptcy might make sense for a country, rather than dismissing
it out of hand. The first factor is especially important for a country,
like Greece or Italy, that falls into financial distress. Before joining
the European Union, these countries were less likely to have
unsustainable debt because they had the option of devaluing their
currency in the event of a crisis.145 In adopting the euro, they gave
up this flexibility146—at least so long as Greece does not exit the
142. I have discussed the church bankruptcy issue in more detail (and have given a more
enthusiastic defense than my five-factor analysis leads me to give here) elsewhere. David A.
Skeel, Jr., “Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
345, 359-60 (2005); David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 11 B.C. L. REV. 1181,
1182-83 (2003).
143. See Skeel, supra note 36, at 1090.
144. See GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1-2.
145. Currency devaluation can “bring an unsustainably negative current account into
balance” by encouraging exports and discouraging imports. See William C. Gruben, South
American Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies: Their Implications for the FTAA, 6 NAFTA:
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 457, 458 (2000) (“The idea, of course, is for the prices of the home country’s
products as expressed in dollars to fall enough to increase foreign purchases of these products
and for the prices of the foreign country’s products as expressed in [for example] pesos to go
up correspondingly.”).
146. One of the reasons Argentina’s crisis in the early 2000s was so severe was that it had
limited its devaluation option by issuing a significant amount of debt that required repayment
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euro, a possibility I will consider below. Like U.S. states, Euro
members cannot print money to deal with a debt crisis. The absence
of a money printing option increases the benefits of bankruptcy for
dealing with unsustainable debt.
Each of the next three factors also play out very similarly for
Greece, other Euro members, and for U.S. states. Although bank-
ruptcy cannot change a country’s decision makers, it would reshape
decision making by giving creditors a greater incentive to monitor,
as consumer bankruptcy does and state bankruptcy would. The
third factor—the risk of premature liquidation—weighs against
bankruptcy because premature liquidation is not a concern. And the
fourth—dignity—is mixed: bankruptcy can be seen as undermining
a country’s dignity but it also brings an end to creditor harassment.
The principal difference between Greece and a U.S. state is the
risk of spillover effects. In both contexts, observers have warned
that a bankruptcy option would trigger a contagion effect in bond
markets.147 These fears are almost certainly unfounded, particularly
given that we are considering only the enactment of a bankruptcy
law, not an actual bankruptcy filing. Contagion is a serious concern
only if sovereign debt and state bond markets cannot distinguish
profligate countries or states from fiscally responsible ones.148 But
a different kind of spillover effect is a more legitimate issue.
Throughout the Greek crisis, large amounts of Greek debt were held
by French and German banks that were themselves systemically
important, and might have plausibly been destabilized by Greece’s
failure to pay.149 The ownership profile of U.S. state debt is quite
different—the largest holders are mutual funds and wealthy in-
state residents, not systemically important banks.150 The threat of
spillover effects is considerably lower as a result.
in dollars. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET,
THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA xviii-xix (2005).
147. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 36, at 1067-68 (“The fear that the state bankruptcy would
trigger crippling bond market contagion has been one of the most widely credited arguments
against state bankruptcy.”); Stefan Schultz, Fears of Euro Zone Domino Effect: Will Greek
Contagion Bring Portugal Down?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 30, 2010, 1:43 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/fears-of-euro-zone-domino-effect-will-greek-con
tagion-bring-portugal-down-a-692251.html.
148. For discussion in the context of U.S. states, see Skeel, supra note 36, at 1068-69.
149. Id. at 1090-91.
150. Id. at 1090.
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Although spillover concerns are greater in Europe, the problem
could be alleviated in two ways. First, European regulatory rules
that treated the sovereign debt of all European countries as risk
free, and thus gave banks a perverse incentive to buy Greek debt
(which offered a high return), could, and clearly should, be
changed.151 In addition, European regulators are working on a
resolution framework that is designed to limit fallout in the event
a large European bank fails.152 These developments suggest that a
bankruptcy framework could improve Europe’s current ad hoc
framework, although the case is less robust than it is for U.S. states.
Bankruptcy is not the only alternative to the status quo in
Europe, however. When I initially questioned whether Greece’s debt
and that of other troubled European countries was unsustainable,
I assumed that Europe would not alter its existing governance
structure. But it could. One much discussed strategy would bring a
shift toward “fiscal union”—that is, toward greater European
control of the finances of its member states.153 If Europe moved
decisively in this direction, financial failure would be less likely, and
Europe would explicitly or implicitly agree to bail out any country
that might otherwise be unable to meet its obligations. Alterna-
tively, Europe could adopt a two-track euro, in which countries that
are financially unstable would be required to exit the euro until
their finances returned to a stable footing.154 Countries that left the
euro would have the option of devaluing their currency in order to
meet their obligations. The second option is an imperfect solu-
tion—it would need to include a prohibition against issuing debt
that could only be paid in euros, for instance, and devaluation could
151. See, e.g., Daniel Gross, EZ Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus, VOX (June 14,
2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/ez-banking-union-sovereign-virus (noting that sovereign
debt holdings still carry a zero weighting).
152. Jim Brunsden & Rebecca Christie, EU Unveils Bank-Crisis Plan with $55 Billion Euro
Fund, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-09/eu-steels-for-
battle-over-bank-resolution-plans-led-by-germany.html.
153. See, e.g., Eurozone Crisis Demands One Banking Policy, One Fiscal Policy—and One
Voice, GUARDIAN: ECON. BLOG (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/econom
ics-blog/2013/apr/01/eurozone-crisis-banking-fiscal-union/print.
154. See Charles W. Calomiris, Exiting the Euro Crisis, in LIFE IN THE EUROZONE WITH OR
WITHOUT SOVEREIGN DEFAULT? 115, 121-22 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2011); Breaking Up
the Euro Area: How to Resign from the Club, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2010, at 88.
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trigger dangerous levels of inflation. But both are plausible
alternatives to bankruptcy.
Some have argued that an informal system of international
bankruptcy already exists, with fairly well developed rules of
priority.155 Bonds can be restructured in the event of a financial
crisis, whereas ordinary trade debt and the new money provided by
the International Monetary Fund or other international institutions
are entitled to payment in full.156 The new European Financial
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) that Europe created to provide rescue
funding for troubled European Union countries appears to be
designed to fit within this or a similar framework.157 This loosely
coordinated framework lacks some of the benefits that a more
formal structure could bring, but it can be seen as an emerging
bankruptcy system. The principal risk is that the EFSM will provide
rescue funding even in the absence of genuine restructuring,158 and
thus that Europe will end up in a no man’s land between fiscal
union, on the one hand, and an effective bankruptcy framework, on
the other.
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that our standard intuitions about
bankruptcy are both sensible and wrong. Although it seems obvious
that we need personal and corporate bankruptcy, that municipal
bankruptcy is problematic but defensible, and that state and
national bankruptcy are beyond the pale, there are problems with
each part of this left-to-right continuum. Personal bankruptcy is not
inevitable, for instance, and state bankruptcy appears to be more
necessary than municipal bankruptcy. To determine when bank-
ruptcy is appropriate, we need to start with a different framework.
155. Anne-Marie Slaughter has made this argument in expert reports filed on behalf of
Argentina in its litigation over obligations incurred under bilateral investment treaties. 
156. Zoe Chace, Why IMF Loans Always Get Repaid, NPR (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:16 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/03/146327391/why-imf-loans-always-get-repaid.
157. European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
158. For a call for the IMF to require the restructuring of private debt as a condition of its
financing, see Douglas G. Baird et al., The Role of the IMF in Future Sovereign Debt
Restructurings (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2360274.
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I have advocated a five-factor approach that considers: (1) whether
unsustainable debt is a potential problem; (2) the benefits of
reshaping decision-making incentives; (3) the risk of premature
liquidation; (4) the dignity of the debtor; and (5) spillover effects.
It is important to note, as I did at the outset of this Article, that
I have focused solely on the issue of whether to implement a
bankruptcy framework. I have not considered, except indirectly, the
details of any specific bankruptcy law. Particular features, such as
the priority rules or whether the managers of a corporate debtor are
ousted at the beginning of the case, can have a crucial effect on how
the bankruptcy works. I have set these details to the side and have
focused entirely on the question of whether bankruptcy is or is not
desirable in any given context.
The framework I have provided does not give simple, permanent
answers to the question of when bankruptcy should be an option for
each type of debtor that we have considered. Whether bankruptcy
makes sense in Europe depends on whether Europe moves toward
fiscal union or provides an exit from the euro. Personal bankruptcy
is not necessary if consumers do not have access to meaningful
amounts of credit. Even corporate bankruptcy is not inevitable.
Although we often cannot determine the desirability of bankruptcy
in the abstract, the framework has produced several surprising
conclusions, even in the handful of applications we considered. The
framework suggests that state bankruptcy would function more like
bankruptcy for consumers than for corporations, that it makes even
more sense than municipal bankruptcy, and that a corporate
bankruptcy option is not always necessary. I hope these initial
findings suggest that the framework may be worth pursuing.
